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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in which the location of sensors is a key information are
becoming more and more important. Moreover, in many cases privacy is a key issues for
such network which can be the target of different kind of security attacks. In this paper
we present an approach, named Cross Layer Protocol (CLP), for improving data quality based
on an integrated solution that considers a sound privacy management policy coupled with
a secure localization protocol. More speciﬁcally, CLP exploits consistency between the
information on nodes behavior gathered during localization phase and privacy compliance
veriﬁcation to evaluate nodes reputation. Finally CLP effectiveness is evaluated by means of
a set of simulations.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) technologies support
data collection and distributed data processing by means
of very small sensing devices [1], with limited computation
and energy capabilities. WSN are used in many contexts,
such as telemedicine, surveillance systems, assistance to
disabled and elderly people, environmental monitoring,
localization of services and users, industrial process con-
trol, and systems supporting trafﬁc monitoring/control in
urban/suburban areas, military and/or anti-terrorism
operations.
In many applications contexts the location of sensor
nodes [1] is an important information that can be used
to identify the location of an event of interest (e.g., the
location of an intruder, the location of a ﬁre, etc.). In
other cases, location information facilitates application
services, such as location directory services (e.g., locating
medical equipment and personnel in a smart hospital,
locating survivors in debris, etc). Finally, it can be used
in system functionalities such as geographical routing. All rights reserved.
x: +39 0332 218 919.
a.it (A. Coen-Porisini),and location-based information querying. Hence, loca-
tion-aware sensors are becoming the de facto standard
in all application domains requiring location-based
service.
The simplest way to provide localization information
consists in equipping each sensor with a GPS receiver.
However, this solution is not feasible from an economic
nor a technical point of view since sensors are often de-
ployed in large numbers and require manual conﬁgura-
tion. A feasible approach, instead, consists in having
nodes cooperating among them in order to compute their
position. However, the main drawback is that several
security attacks, such as node displacement, distance
enlargement (by introducing fake nodes), dissemination
of false position and distance information (by compromis-
ing nodes) can take place. Hence, trustworthiness and
security of localization information are fundamental
requirements in WSN.
Privacy is another crucial issue for many WSN applica-
tions such as localization and telemedicine. Moreover, in
many other application contexts in which data referring
to individuals are not directly handled by the WSN, privacy
needs to be taken into account. For example, in home net-
works, sensor nodes may collect a large amount of data
Fig. 1. A WSN privacy policy.
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their privacy. However, wireless communications and the
deployment in uncontrolled environments raise several is-
sues in order to guarantee privacy (and security) since
malicious tampering of sensors and/or trafﬁc may jeopar-
dize the conﬁdentiality, the integrity, and the availability
of data.
Traditional approaches to security and privacy are
based on access control and strong authentication. Unfor-
tunately neither of them are suitable to WSN because of
the limited resources and short battery life of sensors.
Moreover, approaches based on pre-shared encryption
keys are prone to physical attacks since sensor devices
and their key can be easily cloned.
This paper, which extends the preliminary results pre-
sented in [24], tackles both secure localization and pri-
vacy issues in order to deﬁne an integrated solution
that considers a sound privacy management policy cou-
pled with a secure localization protocol. The presented
approach is based on the assessment of data quality, that
is we evaluate to which extent the information to be pro-
cessed by applications is reliable and trustworthy. This is
done by introducing a way to evaluate the overall data
quality when several cheap protection techniques are
combined together. Although none of the used techniques
guarantees reliability and trustworthy by itself, we ex-
ploit consistency across them to evaluate data reliability.
As a result we introduce a protocol, named Cross-Layer
Protocol (CLP), that deﬁnes the fundamental steps for
assessing data quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the foundations for modeling privacy and de-
scribes the reference scenario. Section 3 introduces CLP
that integrates privacy management policies and secure
localization for cross-layer data assessment. Section 4 re-
ports a set of simulations whose aim is to evaluate CLP.
Section 5 presents some related works. Finally, Section 6
draws some conclusions and provides hints for future
works.2. Foundations
In what follows we provide a short description of the
privacy model used in this paper, which is discussed more
in detail in [2–4], along with the assumptions made on
both the network and the messages.2.1. Privacy model
A privacy policy deﬁnes the way in which data refer-
ring to individuals can be collected, processed, and dif-
fused according to the rights that individuals are
entitled to. The rest of the paper adopts the terminology
introduced by the EU directive [7]. Notice that, since the
proposed terms are general, i.e., it is necessary to reﬁne
them in order to provide the concepts needed for sup-
porting the deﬁnition of privacy mechanisms in WSN
communications. In the following, a short overview of
the conceptual model for privacy policies is illustrated.
The structural aspects are deﬁned using UML classesand their relationships. Fig. 1 depicts a class diagram that
provides a high level view of the basic structural elements
of the model.
A WSN Privacy Policy is characterized by three types of
classes: Node,Data, and Action. Nodes interact among them
inside the network in order to perform some kind of ac-
tions on data. Thus, an instance of WSN PrivacyPolicy is
characterized by speciﬁc instances of Node, Data, and Ac-
tion, and by the relationships among such entities.
Node represents a member of the network and it is
characterized by a function and a role. The former de-
scribes the task performed by the node within the net-
work in which it operates (e.g., data sensing, message
transmission, message forwarding, data aggregation,
etc.), while the latter describes the role played by the
node with respect to privacy. Three distinct classes repre-
sent the different roles: Subject, which is a node that
senses the data; Processor, which is a node that processes
data by performing some kind of action on them (e.g.,
transmission, forwarding, aggregation, etc.); Controller,
which is a node that veriﬁes the actions executed by pro-
cessor nodes.
Data represents the information handled by processors
and is extended by Identiﬁable data and Sensed data. The
former represents the information that can be used to un-
iquely identify nodes (e.g., node identiﬁer) while the latter
represents the information that is sensed by the nodes of
the network (e.g., temperature, pressure). Moreover,
Sensed data is further extended by means of Sensitive data,
which represents the information that deserves particular
care and that should not be freely accessible (e.g., health
related data). Data is a complex structure composed of ba-
sic information units, named Fields, each of which repre-
sents a partial information related to the whole data
structure. Moreover, data are aggregated among them to
compose Messages, which represents the basic communi-
cation unit exchanged by the nodes of the network.
Action represents any operation performed by Node and
is extended by Obligation, Processing, and Purpose. More-
over, each action can be recursively composed of other ac-
tions. Since in a privacy aware scenario a processing is
executed under a purpose and an obligation, Processing
speciﬁes an aggregation relationship with Purpose and
Obligation. Notice that in the context of WSN each function
usually corresponds to one action.
In order to guarantee the conﬁdentiality and integrity of
data as well as to assure that only authorized nodes are al-
lowed to access such data and execute actions encryption
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senting encryption keys, named DataKey and FunctionRole-
Key, are introduced. The former key is used to protect
sensed data; while the latter is used to ensure that mes-
sage communication and data handling are executed only
by authorized nodes.
2.2. The network
We consider a dense network composed of N nodes in
which each node senses a given type of data (e.g., temper-
ature, pressure, brightness, position, and so on). Nodes are
uniquely identiﬁed by means of a label n and can exchange
messages so that all sensed data are directed to the sink.
Each node directly communicates with its closer neighbors
(at one hop distance) and thus, a sensed data before reach-
ing the sink passes through different nodes of the network
(multi-hop communication) by means of different mes-
sages. Notice that the broadcast nature of wireless chan-
nels enables a node to determine, by overhearing the
channel, whether its messages are received and forwarded
by its neighbors [9].
Messages represent a single transmission hop between
adjacent nodes and contain data that may be classiﬁed as
identiﬁable and sensed. A message is denoted by msgn,q,
where n identiﬁes the node that generated and transmitted
the message and q identiﬁes the message among those
generated by node n. Thus, the pair (n,q) unambiguously
identiﬁes the message among those transmitted in the net-
work. In order to guarantee the integrity and conﬁdential-
ity of the end-to-end communication, we use a message
structure that keeps track of the last two hops of the trans-
mission. Therefore, a message msgn,q, is a tuple.
msgn,q = hcurr,prev,sub,sensId,errId,errFlag,data, idListi
where:1 The Sensing-Subject key is equivalent to the DataKey deﬁned in the
conceptual model.– curr: is the couple hn,qi, which unambiguously identi-
ﬁes the current message among those transmitted
within the network by node n.
– prev: is a couple hnp,qpi, where np, is the identiﬁer of
the node that operated the second last forwarding of
the sensed data contained in the current message,
and qp is the identiﬁer used by np to identify such a
message.
– sub: is a couple hns,qsi where ns is the identiﬁer of the
node that originally sensed the data, and qs is the mes-
sage identiﬁer used by such a node for the message that
started the communication of the sensed data towards
the sink. Notice that in case of error notiﬁcation (see
Reception and Integrity Veriﬁcation Protocol) this ﬁeld
identiﬁes the node that found the error.
– sensId: is a couple hnsi,qsii that in case of error notiﬁca-
tion contains the identiﬁer of the node that sensed the
correct data and the identiﬁer of the message transmit-
ted by such a node.
– errId: is a tuple hnei,qeii, which contains the identiﬁer
of the node that generated the error and the identiﬁer of
the message containing the error transmitted by such a
node.– errFlag: represents an error code reporting whether an
anomaly was identiﬁed in the message content.
– data: includes the ciphered data c either sensed or
aggregated by the subject node or the aggregator node,
respectively.
– idList: is a list containing the identiﬁers of the nodes
that already processed the data content of the
message.
Notice that ﬁelds sensId and errId are used only when
errFlag equals 1, that is the message reports an error
notiﬁcation.
In order to guarantee the conﬁdentiality of messages
content every ﬁeld but errFlag is ciphered. Notice that a
node may play different functions and roles and there-
fore it may own multiple function-role keys (one for
each pair of function-role). More speciﬁcally the follow-
ing function-role pairs are deﬁned: Sensing-Subject (SS),
Authenticator–Processor (AP), Transmitter–Processor
(TP) and Notiﬁer–Controller (NC). Keys are denoted
by k(n, fr), where n is the node label and fr 2 {SS,AP,
TP,NC} is the function-role played by node n.1 We as-
sume that keys are pre-shared in the nodes and that
each node contains a table in which it stores the last
sent messages.
At sink level, nodes are classiﬁed, as far as localization is
concerned, in Veriﬁer and Unknown nodes. The former are
nodes whose position is known, while the latter are those
whose position is unknown. Notice that Veriﬁer nodes are
able to cooperate among them to verify the position of an
unknown node.3. CLP: the proposed solution
In what follows the protocols introduced in order to
guarantee secure localization and to meet privacy require-
ments are presented. More speciﬁcally the protocols intro-
duced are the following:
– Sensing, which deﬁnes the actions that a node carries
out to communicate sensed data to the other nodes of
the network
– Message Reception and Integrity Veriﬁcation, which
deﬁnes the actions that a node carries out when receiv-
ing a message from other nodes in order to verify its
integrity and possibly to re-transmit it over the network
– Secure localization, which deﬁnes the action that a node
carries out to localize in secure manner. The output of
this phase are the coordinates of the node along with
an evaluation of their trustworthiness, which are stored
by the sink
– Cross-layer node evaluation, which deﬁnes the actions
performed by the sink in order to evaluate nodes repu-
tation using the information gathered from the localiza-
tion phase and by evaluating privacy policies
compliance.
msgn,q+1 = hcurr,prev, sub, sensId,errId, errFlag,data, idListi, where
–curr = hEnc(n,k(n,TP)), Enc(q + 1,k(n,TP))i;
–prev = e;
–sub = hEnc(n,k(n,TP)), Enc(q + 1,k(n,TP))i;
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data integrity; (ii) anonymity and (iii) secure node localiza-
tion by using cross-layer data evaluation.
3.1. The sensing protocol
Let n be a node sensing a data d from the environment
where it is located. According to the function-role classiﬁ-
cation, when sensing d the node acts as a Sensing-Subject
(SS) and therefore d is encrypted using key k (n, SS).
Moreover, let q denote the number of messages that n
already transmitted over the network. Thus, message
mn,q+1 is prepared according to the structure discussed in
the previous section. Notice that, when preparing the mes-
sage the node acts as a Transmitter–Processor (TP) and
therefore every ciphered ﬁeld but data is encrypted using
key k (n,TP).msgn,q+1 = hcurr,prev, sub, sensId,errId,errFlag,data, idListi, where
–curr = hEnc(n,k(n,TP)), Enc(q + 1,k(n,TP))i;
–prev = ea;
–sub = hEnc(n,k(n,TP)), Enc(q + 1,k(n,TP))i;
–sendId = e;
–errId = e;
–errFlag = 0;
–data = Enc(d,k(n,SS));
–idList = {Enc(n,k(n,TP))}.
a e represents an empty ﬁeld.
–sendId = retrieved.sub;
–errId =mj,h.curr;
–errFlag = 1;
–data = Enc(retrieved.data, k(n,NC));
–idList =mj,h.idList [ {Enc(n,k(n,TP))}.Once prepared part of the message (ﬁelds data and sub-
ject) is stored in the local table before being put in the
transmission queue.3.2. Message reception and integrity veriﬁcation protocol
Let n be a node receiving a messagemj,h, and let q be the
number of messages already transmitted by n over the net-
work. The message is analyzed to ﬁnd out whether it was
originally transmitted by the node itself. This can be done
searching the local table using the content of ﬁeld prev as
hash key. If the search fails n has to re-transmit the mes-
sage over the network, that is n acts as a Transmitter–
Processor (TP). Thus a new message msgn,q+1 is prepared
and then it is stored in the local table before being put in
transmission queue.msgn,q+1 = hcurr,prev, sub, sensId,errId,errFlag,data, idListi, where
–curr = hEnc(n,k(n,TP)), Enc(q + 1,k(n,TP))i;
–prev =mj,h.curra;
–sub =mj,h.sub;
–sendId =mj,h.sendId;
–errId = e;
–errFlag = 0;
–data =mj,h.data;
–idList =mj,h.idList [ {Enc(n,k(n,TP))}.
a mj,h.curr stands for ﬁeld curr of message mj,hInstead if the search succeeds, then mj,h was transmit-
ted by n and therefore the integrity of the received
message is veriﬁed, that is n acts as a Notiﬁer–Controller(NC). Hence, the node compares the content of ﬁeld data,
of the received message with the information retrieved
from its table. If the information matches, this means that
the controller is sure that the node from which it received
the message preserved the integrity of the data, position
and weight content. In this case, no additional action is
performed by the node.
If the content of ﬁeld data is different from the one ex-
tracted from the local table or no data entry corresponds to
the search key, this means that something wrong hap-
pened. In this case, the node generates a new message
msgn,q+1 in order to notify the sink that a corrupted mes-
sage is spreading through the network.Notice that errFlag is set to 1 to indicate that the current
message is an error message; ﬁeld prev is empty to avoid
message loops with the malicious node and the spreading
of error messages; both ﬁelds sub and curr are set to n to
specify which node found the error; sendId equals ﬁeld
sub of the message stored in the local table, to report which
node has sensed the original data that was found to be cor-
rupted; errId equals ﬁeld curr of the received message to
report which node made the mistake. Finally, ﬁeld data is
set by encrypting with the Notiﬁer–Controller key the hom-
onymous ﬁeld retrieved from the local table.
Once generated the message is stored in the local table
before being put in the transmission queue.3.3. Secure localization
Node positions are evaluated using a multilateration
technique, which determines the node coordinates by
exploiting a set of landmark nodes, called anchor nodes,
whose positions are known. The position of an unknown
node u is computed using an estimation of the distances
between the anchor nodes and u. Notice that such dis-
tances are computed by measuring the time needed to
get a reply to a beacon message sent to u. This is done un-
der the assumption that the speed of the signal in the med-
ium in which the transmission occurs is known.
In case node u behaves maliciously, the only way in
which it may pretend to be in a location different to the ac-
tual one is by delaying the reply to the beacon message.
However, under some conditions, it is possible to detect
such malicious behaviors by using the Veriﬁable Multila-
teration (VM) technique [22], which uses three or more an-
chor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes. In what follows
we brieﬂy report the VM technique for the sake of com-
pleteness (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. UML model.
V1
V2 V3
Actual position of u 
Fake position of u 
Fig. 3. Veriﬁable multilateration.
A. Coen-Porisini, S. Sicari / Computer Networks 56 (2012) 3655–3665 3659Let V1; V2 and V3 be the anchor nodes (i.e., the veriﬁers)
and let be u the node whose position is unknown. More-
over, let us assume that u lies in the triangle formed by
V1; V2; V3. If u tries to pretend to be farther away from
one anchor then it has to pretend to be closer to another
one. Since this cannot be done it is possible to ﬁgure out
that u is misbehaving. As an example Fig. 3 shows a node
u pretending to be in a position farther away from V1 than
the actual position. As a consequence the position of u
would result closer to V3.
Therefore, if the veriﬁers are trusted and they can com-
municate securely the sink can check the localization data,
in the following way. Let T1, T2 and T3 be the time needed
to get an answer from u to the beacon message sent by V1,
V2 and V3, respectively. Starting from Ti the corresponding
distance bound dbi [23] is computed,2 for 1 6 i 6 3.
Let hxu,yui denote the coordinates of the estimated posi-
tion of u, and let fi(xu,yu) denote the function representing
the difference between the distance bound and the esti-
mated distance of u from Vi.
fiðxu; yuÞ ¼ dbi 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðxu  xiÞ2 þ ðyu  yiÞ2
q
ð1Þ2 The distance bound dbi is the upper bound of the distance between Vi
and u.Finally, the estimated position of u is computed using
the minimum mean square estimate (MMSE) that is by
minimizing
Fðxu; yuÞ ¼
X3
i¼1
ðfiðxu; yuÞÞ2 ð2Þ
Once computed, the estimated position of u undergoes
two different tests before being considered as reliable.
The ﬁrst test, known as d-test, aims at verifying whether
Fig. 4. The ﬁrst network topology.
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bounds previously computed, while the second test,
known as point-in-the-triangle-test, aims at verifying
whether the estimated position of u lies inside the triangle
formed by the three veriﬁers. More speciﬁcally,
– d-test: Let derr denote the maximum distance measure-
ment error allowable; therefore the position of u, hxu,
yui, is considered correct if fi(xu,yu) < derr, for 1 6 i 6 3.
If the test fails then at least for one Vi the estimated dis-
tance differs from the distance bound by more than
allowed error. In a such a case the estimation is consid-
ered to be affected by malicious tampering and there-
fore node u is marked as Malicious.
– Point in the triangle test: Distance bounds can used in
the previous test only if u lies inside the triangle formed
by the three veriﬁers, otherwise the position of u is con-
sidered unveriﬁed and therefore node u is marked as
Unknown.
If both tests are passed, the sink considers the estimated
position as correct and therefore node u is marked as
Robust.
3.4. Cross-layer node evaluation
The sink evaluates the trustworthiness of the nodes of
the network by looking at the messages it receives and
by using the information gathered during the localization
phase. Notice that the sink uses a node reputation table
to store information about nodes trustworthiness. Such a
table reports for each node two different values, the ﬁrst
of which provides information about node localization
(i.e., Robust, Malicious or Unknown), while the second one
provides information about privacy compliance (i.e., Priva-
cyCompliant or PrivacyViolation). Notice that initially, an-
chor nodes (i.e., veriﬁers) are considered to be Robust,
while the remaining nodes are classiﬁed as Unknown.
Moreover, initially all nodes are considered to be
PrivacyCompliant.
Each time the sink receives a message it carries out the
evaluation by checking whether ﬁeld errFlag is set to 1 or
not. If it is, this means that the received message is an error
notiﬁcation message. As a consequence, the reputation of
the node whose identiﬁer is reported by ﬁeld idErr (i.e.,
the node that made the mistakes reported by the message)
is updated by assigning the value PrivacyViolation. Notice
that, in such a case the ﬁeld data of the message contains
the correct message, which can be further processed by
the sink.
Otherwise, if ﬁeld errFlag equals 0 then the received
message contains sensed data and therefore the sink be-
fore processing data evaluates the trustworthiness of all
the nodes that handled the sensed data (i.e., the nodes
whose identiﬁers are stored in ﬁelds sub, idList and curr).
This is done by verifying their reputation as stored in the
reputation table.
If the reputation is Robust and PrivacyCompliant the
sink considers the data as reliable; otherwise if the repu-
tation is Malicious or PrivacyViolation the data are dis-
carded; ﬁnally if the reputation is Unknown andPrivacyCompliant the data may be processed or discarded
depending on the sink policy. For example, let us consider
a node n whose reputation is Unknown, in such a case the
sink may take into account the reputation of the neigh-
boring nodes (i.e., nodes that can communicate directly
with n) and discard the data if any of them is classiﬁed
as Malicious.
Finally, it must be noticed that a malicious node may
decide not to lie on its position, still providing fake infor-
mation in term of sensed data. In order to uncover this kind
of malicious behaviors other consistency properties can be
exploited. For example, the sink of a system monitoring
temperature may receive from a node a datum of 40 C,
while all the others nodes report 20 C. Since such an
abrupt change in temperature may be considered as anom-
alous, the sink may decide to discard the former informa-
tion. However, this kind of data validation depends
highly on the application domain and therefore no general
policy can be provided.
Notice that even if fake data may be produced by a node
that provided authentic localization information, knowing
the real position of the malicious node may help the sink to
take appropriate counter-measures. In conclusion, cross-
layer analysis enables a more careful assessment of the
overall quality of the received data, thus avoiding mali-
cious poisoning.4. Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the solution
presented in this paper we simulated the behavior of a
wireless sensor network measuring the temperature of a
given environment. The aim of the simulations was to
compare the behavior of a network that uses both secure
localization and privacy compliance with the behavior of
a network that adopts either secure localization, such as
Capkun et al. [22] or a privacy aware solution such as Coen
et al. [3].
The simulations were carried out using Omnet++ [10]
and aimed at evaluating the presented approach with
Fig. 5. % Of discarded messages and no. of transmitted messages.
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tify malicious nodes, the robustness to an increasing num-
ber of malicious nodes and the robustness to different
network topologies.
The ﬁrst network taken into account is reported in Fig. 4
and is composed by ﬁve veriﬁers v[0    4], two sensors
s[0    1], and the sink si. Moreover, we assume that only
node s[1] is behaving maliciously, that is it provides fake
localization information and it violates the privacy policy
by tampering messages.
The results, reported in Fig. 5 show that by combining
localization and privacy, it is possible to identify 14% more
of corrupted messages in comparison with Coen et al.,
while the number of messages transmitted over the net-
work increased by 44% with respect to Coen et al. and by
57% with respect to Capkun et al.
Notice that node s[1] in order to communicate a fake
position needs to forge localization information sent by
veriﬁer v[4]. This can be done since messages coming from
veriﬁer v[4] go through s[1] in order to reach the sink. In
other words s[1] can isolate v[4] from the rest of the net-
work. Thus, only localization may not be enough to detect
the malicious behavior of s[1]. However, if s[1] modiﬁes
messages coming from v[4], most likely it will modify also
messages coming from other nodes and this would cause
notiﬁcation error messages to be sent to the sink. As a con-
sequence the sink will downgrade the reputation of s[1] to
PrivacyViolation.
In general in order to prevent attacks based on isolation
of anchor nodes it is necessary that their position in theFig. 6. The second network topology.network is such that at least two different paths that can
be used to send messages to the sink exist.
As a second example we considered a network, reported
in Fig. 6, comprising ﬁve veriﬁers v[0    4], three sensors
s[0    2] and the sink si. Notice that we carried out several
simulations to compare the results of our approach when
either nodes s[1] or s[2] behaves maliciously with the case
in which both of them do.
Fig. 7 reports the results that show that the number of
discarded messages increases by 42% when node s[2] be-
haves maliciously in addition to s[1] and that the number
of discarded messages depends on the position of the cor-
rupted node.
In fact the network performance depends on the num-
ber of uncorrupted paths towards the sink. Thus, reducing
the number of uncorrupted paths causes an increase in the
number of discarded messages.
The above results show that the most important param-
eter is the position of the malicious node(s) rather than
their number. In fact, the number of discarded messages
increases with the number of communication paths in
which a node behaves maliciously.
Fig. 8 shows another network that differs from the pre-
vious one in the number of veriﬁers (increased to seven)
and in the density3 of nodes distribution (the former is den-
ser than the latter). Notice that this network has less paths
to the sink with respect to the one of Fig. 6.
Fig. 9 reports the comparison between the two topolo-
gies, in term of number of discarded messages, assuming
that node s[1] behaves maliciously in both networks.
The results show that in a more dense network even if
with less nodes the sink discards more messages.
Finally, in order to evaluate the behavior of CLP in a real
setting we considered the network of Fig. 10, which is com-
posed of 127 nodes (59 veriﬁers and 68 plain nodes).
This network was analyzed considering different kinds
of malicious behaviors consisting in messages tampering
(privacy violation) and/or fake location information. The
ﬁrst issue that we investigated was the relationship be-
tween the number of malicious nodes and the total num-
ber of messages transmitted over the network, since such
a number can increase because of error notiﬁcation mes-
sages that are transmitted towards the sink. The results, re-
ported in Fig. 11, show that the number of messages3 In this context network density measures the presence of redundant
paths towards the sink.
Fig. 8. The third network topology.
Fig. 9. Discarded messages in different topologies.
Fig. 7. Different no. of malicious nodes/different positions of the malicious node.
Fig. 10. The fourth ne
3662 A. Coen-Porisini, S. Sicari / Computer Networks 56 (2012) 3655–3665increases linearly with the number of malicious nodes in
the network.
The second issue concerns whether CLP is able to iden-
tify all the malicious nodes in the network. For this pur-
pose we set up two different scenarios, made of ﬁve
malicious nodes. In the ﬁrst one three nodes provide fake
localization information, while the remaining two violate
the privacy policy. In the second scenario one node pro-
vides fake localization information, two violate the privacy
policy and the two present both misbehaviors.
The results, expressed in term of node classiﬁcation, are
reported in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively. Notice that the
number of node classiﬁed as Robust decreases when using
CLP with respect to the case in which only localization
information is used (VM). Moreover, in both scenario CLP
correctly identiﬁes all the malicious nodes, while in the
second scenario one of the nodes providing fake localiza-
tion information is not detected by using only VM.
Thus, we decided to further investigate this aspect con-
sidering two more scenarios representing a stress test
characterized by 25 malicious nodes, in which ﬁve nodes
provide fake localization information, 15 violate the pri-
vacy policy and the remaining ﬁve do both violations.
The difference between the two scenarios is the geograph-
ical distribution of the malicious nodes in the network.
The results, reported in Figs. 14 and 15, show that CLP
identiﬁes in both scenarios every malicious node in the
network. In both cases we compared the results of CLP
with those obtained by using the two techniques (VMtwork topology.
Fig. 11. No. of transmitted messages vs no. of malicious nodes.
Fig. 12. Node classiﬁcation VM vs CLP: three localization malicious and
two privacy malicious. Fig. 13. Node classiﬁcation VM vs CLP: 1 localization malicious, 2 privacy
malicious and 2 malicious for both privacy and localization.
Fig. 14. Performance evaluation of CLP: identiﬁcation of 25 malicious nodes.
Fig. 15. Performance evaluation of CLP: identiﬁcation of 25 malicious nodes with an increment of malicious node in localization phase.
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the result of Fig. 14 shows that in the ﬁrst scenario, using
only VM only seven out of 10 nodes providing fake locali-
zation information are detected,4 that is three nodes are not
identiﬁed as malicious due to the lack of information pro-
vided by the veriﬁers.
Finally, we carried out some more simulations to see
what kind of relation exists among the number of mes-
sages transmitted over the network and other parameters
such as the position of the malicious nodes and the number
of veriﬁers in the network. In both cases the results
showed that such parameters have not a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the number of transmitted messages, while they
can affect the effectiveness of the approach.5. Related works
In WSN, the wireless nature of the communication
channel and the remote access increase the risk of privacy,
integrity and conﬁdentiality violations. In fact, exploiting
such intrinsic vulnerabilities the following common
threats may occur [12,13]:
– Eavesdropping: malicious users could easily discover the
communication content listening to data.
– Masking: some malicious nodes may mask their real
nature behind the identity of nodes that are authorized
to take part to communication, and misroute the
messages.
Designing secure WSN is a very mature research ﬁeld
and the literature reports many solutions addressing at
the same time aggregation issues and security aspects,
such as conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, and
availability (an exhaustive and very comprehensive view
of this topic can be found in [12]). Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, no solution is able to take into
account privacy, data integrity and secure localization
issues at the same time using end-to-end encryption
techniques.
As far as privacy is concerned, the available solutions
may be classiﬁed into two main groups: anonymity mech-
anisms based on data cloaking [11] and privacy policy
based approaches [17].
For instance, [11] proposes a solution that guarantees
the anonymous usage of location based information. More
speciﬁcally, such a solution consists of a cloaking algo-
rithm which regulates the granularity of location informa-
tion to meet the speciﬁed anonymity constraints. This
work only focuses on localization services and therefore,
constrains the middleware architecture required to sup-
port the proposed algorithm. Hence, such a solution cannot
be considered a general context independent anonymity
approach.
Other approaches belonging to the former solution are
K-Anonymity, which guarantees that every record is
indistinguishable from at least k  1 other records [14];4 The total number of nodes providing fake information localization is 10,
i.e., 40% of the malicious nodes.Decentralize Sensible Data, in which sensed location data
is distributed through a spanning tree, so that no single
node holds the complete view of the original data; Secure
Communication Channel, in which the use of a secure com-
munication protocols, such as SPINS [16], reduces the
eavesdropping and active attack risk by means of encryp-
tion techniques; Change Data Trafﬁc, in which the trafﬁc
pattern is altered with some bogus data that obfuscate
the real position of the nodes; Node Mobility, in which
the sensor nodes are moved in order to change dynami-
cally the localization information, making it difﬁcult to
identify the node.
Privacy policy based approaches [3,15,17,18] state who
can use individuals data, which data can be collected, for
what purpose the data can be used, and how they can be
distributed. A common policy based approach addresses
privacy concerns at database layer after data have been
collected [17]. Other works [18] address the access control
and authentication issues, for instance Duri et al. [13] pro-
pose a policy based framework for protecting sensor infor-
mation. Our work provides a contribution in the ﬁeld of
privacy policy based approaches by deﬁning a role-based
context-independent solution that guarantees anonymity
of the nodes and data integrity before sensed data are col-
lected into a database. Our solution may be combined with
both data cloaking mechanisms and some other privacy
policy based approaches.
As far as data integrity is concerned, most of the pro-
posed solutions are based on the adoption of encryption
techniques, ad hoc key distribution schemes [19–21],
authentication, access control solutions. Instead, our ap-
proach proposes to combine some cheap protection tech-
niques even if none of them is totally effective. We rely
on cross-layer evaluation to assess the overall quality of
the collected information. Thus, by combining veriﬁcation
of localization information and the identiﬁcation of privacy
violations we evaluate nodes reputation and therefore data
quality, without wasting power with some complex secu-
rity countermeasures such as public key encryption
techniques.6. Conclusions
Data quality is a fundamental requirement in any WSN
scenario. Although it is very difﬁcult to provide data trust-
worthiness due to the distributed nature and the limited
resource in terms of power, our approach allows the sink
to analyze data trustworthiness by exploiting consistency
on cross-layer information, i.e., node localization and pri-
vacy violations.
More speciﬁcally, the trustworthiness about the node
position information and the privacy compliance are used
for evaluating data trustworthiness. In fact node position,
being target of different kind of attacks (e.g., malicious
node displacement, distance enlargement) can be used to
identify malicious behavior.
Our approach is largely independent from the adopted
routing protocols, the veriﬁcation localization algorithm
and the used encryption technique. Besides assessing data
trustworthiness we provide an integrated framework for
A. Coen-Porisini, S. Sicari / Computer Networks 56 (2012) 3655–3665 3665facing privacy and secure localization issues at the same
time.
The effectiveness of the proposed solution has been
tested by means of many simulations that showed that
CLP, besides guaranteeing anonymity, provides secure
node localization and the capability to identify malicious
behaviors. Moreover the obtained results provided inter-
esting hints on how networks should be designed and
where anchor nodes should be placed.
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